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PROGRAMMING THE FUTURE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY IN BROADCASTING: LUTHERAN
CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD v. FCC
Minorities and women have a very small role in the com-
munications industry.'
Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting tradi-
tional and unexamined ... habits of thought, keeps up
barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and
nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this
country's law and practice.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the growing importance of the Internet and cable tele-
vision, non-cable television and radio currently remain the primary
media through which most Americans receive entertainment and
information.3 Within this communications climate, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered whether the
equal protection requirement that government agencies treat all
groups identically, regardless of past privilege or disadvantage, pre-
cludes the FCC from fostering minority participation in broad-
casting.4
Specifically, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC presented
the issue of whether the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Con-
1. Mike Wells, FCC Struggles for Wireless License Diversity, WASH. POST, Nov. 11,
1994, at C1. "The FCC estimates that women or minorities own only 1 or 2 percent
of all communications companies. Of 10,000 commercial broadcast radio and tel-
evision stations, only 300 are minority controlled." Id.
2. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dismissing
any "moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to per-
petuate a caste system . . . [and] . . . [r]emedial race-based preferences [which]
reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society"). But see
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that remedial laws are
nor ally alid ull nLouua allly Lcqui-.aLlU t, la-wvs n whi-cs tAuA.j- lJ*. ''-
medial laws effect paternalism, which undermines equality).
3. See Hearings on S. 707 & S. 1215 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1989) (tes-
timony of Prof. Dale Kunkel).
4. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
reh'g en banc denied, 154 F.3d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Lutheran Church I).
(347)
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structors, Inc. v. Pena5 effectively invalidated FCC regulations requir-
ing broadcast licensees to institute affirmative minority recruitment
plans.6 In broad terms, Adarand required courts to subject all gov-
ernmentally imposed racial classifications to strict constitutional
scrutiny.7 This mandate emerged, however, from a fractured series
of equal protection cases that created a subde spectrum of permissi-
ble and impermissible remedies and left the practical breadth of
the Adarand holding uncertain."
In Lutheran Church, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals approved an equal protection challenge to FCC equal em-
ployment opportunity criteria for license renewal. 9 The renewal
criteria required each broadcasting licensee to design a program
that would encompass eligible local minorities in its application
pool, because licensees had historically hired few minorities. 10 The
court stated that Adarand controlled the case regardless of whether
the regulations affected ultimate employment decisions, and there-
fore, the court applied a strict scrutiny analysis."
This Note examines Lutheran Church in light of the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence, culminating in the Adarand
decision. Part II of this Note provides background concerning
equal protection cases and the promulgation of equal employment
opportunity (EEO) regulations by the FCC.' 2 Part III details the
5. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
6. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 344, reh'g denied, 154 F.3d at 487.
7. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
8. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence,
see infra notes 17-96 and accompanying text; see also GraigJoseph Alvarez, Note,
Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - Affirmative Action - The Supreme Court's Contin-
uing Journey to the Legal High Ground, Adarand v. Pena, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 225
(1997).
9. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 354.
10. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (a)-(c) (1997).
11. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 351. The court also stated that, after
Adarand, programming diversity ceased to constitute a compelling governmental
interest that could survive strict scrutiny. See id. at 355-56. Some commentators
contend, however, that Adarand merely created ambiguity about whether prospec-
tive diversity can constitute a compelling governmental interest in any context. See
Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L. REv.
1123, 1124-25 (1997) (noting that Metro Broadcasting Court's characterization of
broadcasting diversity as important interest survived Adarand, but fearing educa-
tional affirmative action is doomed under compelling interest requirement of
strict scrutiny). The survival of the prospective diversity interest under strict scru-
tiny, in any context, seems unlikely in the aftermath of the Fifth Circuit holding
that diversity failed to sustain a public law school's affirmative action admission
program against equal protection challenge. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
944-45 (5th Cir. 1996).
12. For a discussion of equal protection cases, see infra notes 17-97 and ac-
companying text.
[Vol. 6: p. 347
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facts underlying Lutheran Church.i3 Part IV describes the conclu-
sions and rationale of the Court of Appeals, including those of two
dissenting judges.' 4 Part V critically analyzes the majority's reason-
ing.15 Finally, Part VI predicts that the court's holding will stifle the
FCC's ability to promote minority participation and ownership in
the communications industries. 16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Equal Protection Cases
Generally, the Supreme Court's equal protection jurispru-
dence indicates that racial classifications warrant strict scrutiny.
17
The complex continuum of opinions produced by the Court shows,
however, that the appropriate standard of analysis has proved diffi-
cult to settle. 18
1. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
The fractured result in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke19 illustrates the divisiveness of affirmative action issues for the
Supreme Court.20 In Bakke, a white male applicant launched a suc-
cessful equal protection challenge against a medical school's policy
of setting aside ten percent of seats in each admitted class for mi-
nority students. 21 Justice Powell's independent opinion announced
13. For a discussion of the facts of Lutheran Church, see infra notes 98-108 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the court's analysis and holding in Lutheran Church, see
infra notes 109-61 and accompanying text.
15. For a critical discussion of the court's decision in Lutheran Church, see
infra notes 162-82 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the potential impact that Lutheran Church may have on
the ability of the FCC to promote minority participation in communications, see
infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
17. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see also
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (requiring strict
scrutiny); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (requiring "searching
examination"); Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)
(requiring "most demanding scrutiny").
18. See Cass Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme
Court, 84 CALIF. L. Rv. 1 " (996;\..1 T. .Miqhkin, Foreword: The Making of a
Turning Point - Metro and Adarand, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 875 (1996).
19. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 319. The University of California at Davis Medical School sub-
jected disadvantaged minority applicants to less stringent admissions standards
than those to which the medical school subjected other applicants. See id. at 305.
The admissions plan set aside 16 of the 100 available seats for members of desig-
nated minority groups, although minorities could also compete for places among
the other 94 seats. See id. at 274. Admissions officers tried to assess whether indi-
3
Marquardt: Programming the Future of Equal Employment pportunity in Broadca
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
350 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JouRNAL
the judgment of the divided Court.2 2 In that opinion, Justice Pow-
ell held that the Fourteenth Amendment extends equal protection
to all individuals, regardless of membership in an historically ex-
ploited or benefited race.23 Justice Powell stated that, although ra-
cial classifications are not unconstitutional per se, they
automatically evoke the most demanding scrutiny. 24
Justice Powell also concluded, however, that federally funded
universities may consider racial or ethnic minority status as one fac-
tor among a range of acceptable factors in the admission process.2 5
His conclusion rested on a conviction that diversity among a stu-
dent body was a constitutionally permissible goal.2 6 Thus, the medi-
cal school's admissions plan satisfied the first prong of the strict
scrutiny analysis by addressing a compelling state interest - educa-
tional diversity.27 The plan failed the second strict scrutiny prong,
vidual minority applicants had suffered actual economic or educational depriva-
tion. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-76.
Bakke, a white male applicant, was rejected twice from the Davis Medical
School, and thereafter, brought equal protection and 1964 Civil Rights Act Tide VI
challenges against the medical school. See id. at 278. Bakke contended that the
superiority of his grades and MCAT scores, compared with those of some of the 16
students filling set-aside seats, indicated that the medical school would have admit-
ted him if he could have competed for all 100 seats. See id. at 275, 277-78.
22. See id. at 269. FourJustices decided the case in Bakke's favor on statutory
grounds without reaching the constitutional question. See id. at 411-12 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
23. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. Specifically, Justice Powell stated that "[t] he
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one indi-
vidual and something else when applied to a person of another color." Id. Justice
Powell considered all racial classifications "inherently suspect," because he could
not discern a method adequate to determine which groups, among the many
groups that could potentially claim historical disadvantage, deserve heightened
legal protection. See id. at 293 n.32, 296-97.
24. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978); see also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[AIII legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That
is not to say that all such rights are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 216 (1943) (-Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are
by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality").
25. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311.
26. See id. at 311-12.
27. See id. But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
that "Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue" and
holding that "any consideration of race or ethnicity by [a state-funded] law school
for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment"); cf. Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher
Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 381, 401-09 (1998) (contending that compelling interest prong comprises
two distinct tests: whether interest is substantively important enough to satisfy pol-
icyjudgment and whether government can satisfy tort-like evidentiary burden).
[Vol. 6: p. 347
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however, because the minority set-aside plan was not a necessary
means to achieve diversity.28
2. Fullilove v. Klutznick
Two years after deciding Bakke, the Supreme Court considered
an equal protection challenge to a federal program that set aside
ten percent of construction grants for minority contractors, in Fulli-
love v. Klutznick.29 Again, the case produced several opinions and
no majority.3 0 In an opinion joined by two others, Chief Justice
Burger stated that "[a] ny preference based on racial or ethnic crite-
ria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make
sure it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees."31
Chief Justice Burger upheld the ten percent set-aside as consti-
tutionally valid under a two part test.3 2 First, he concluded that
Congress had the authority to remedy minority under-representa-
28. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15. The Court found that consideration of mi-
nority status as a factor to assess achievement constituted a less intrusive alternative
means to attain academic diversity because each candidate could thereby compete
for every available seat in a class. See id. at 315-18.
29. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, construction contractor associations
challenged the minority business enterprise (MBE) provision of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977. See id. at 453. The MBE provision stated that, unless the
Secretary of Commerce granted a waiver, the federal government would only grant
funds for local public works projects if at least 10 percent of the grant would fund
minority enterprises. See id. at 454. The statute defined minorities as United States
citizens "who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and
Aleuts." Id.
30. See id. In his concurrence, Justice Powell stated that the proper test
should be whether federal legislation, which uses racial classification is a "necessary
means of advancing a compelling governmental interest." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell concluded that the MBE provisions consti-
tuted "equitable and reasonably necessary means [to redress] identified discrimi-
nation," which he had recognized as a compelling governmental interest in Bakke.
See id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in the
judgment but applied the less exacting standard he had previously advocated in
Bakke. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring). He found the MBE
provision "plainly constitutional" after investigating whether racial classifications,
which are intended to remedy past discrimination, serve important governmental
goals and are substantially related to achieving those goals. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
In disent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, contended that be-
cause the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments
"absolutely prohibits invidious discrimination by government.... any official ac-
tion that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inher-
ently suspect and presumptively invalid." Id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the rule remains appropriate when persons injured by a racially biased
law are members of the majority race. See id. at 525.
31. Id. at 491. Justice Burger advocated significant deference, however, when
considering a racial classification in remedial federal legislation. See id. at 472.
32. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473, 480.
5
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tion in federally funded contracting. 33 Second, he concluded that
in the circumstances, the racial classification constituted a permissi-
ble means to realize the congressional objective.34
3. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,35 the Supreme Court
held that a school board's policy of firing non-minority teachers
before firing minority teachers during layoffs, even if the non-mi-
nority teachers had seniority, violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 6 Writing for a plurality in this
case, Justice Powell applied the two prongs of strict scrutiny.3 7
33. See id. at 473. Justice Burger found that Congress could do so under its
Commerce Power because the provision's legislative history provided a rational
basis for Congress to conclude that the subcontracting practices of prime contrac-
tors could preserve the lack of minority businesses' access to public contracting
opportunities, and that this inequity affects interstate commerce. See id. at 475.
34. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473, 480 (1980). First, with refer-
ence to school desegregation cases, Chief Justice Burger rejected the suggestion
that congressional actions must be "color-blind" because he feared color-blindness
would "freeze the status quo." Id. at 482 (citing N.C. Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402
U.S. 43 (1971)). Second, ChiefJustice Burger concluded that any incidental detri-
ment to innocent non-minority contractors constituted a permissible "sharing of
the burden" inherent in even a narrowly tailored remedial program. See id. at 484.
Third, Chief Justice Burger concluded that Congress could enact more expansive
remedial legislation if the MBE program did not include enough historically disad-
vantaged businesses. See id. at 485. Fourth, ChiefJustice Burger found that admin-
istrative scrutiny provisions excluding non-"bona fide" minority business
enterprises proved that the legislation was not overinclusive. See id. at 487-88.
35. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor joined Justice Powell's opinion. See id. at 269. Justice O'Connor also
wrote separately concerning her conclusion that the provision was not narrowly
tailored. See id. at 294. She concluded that the "disparity between the percentage
of minorities on the teaching staff and the percentage of minorities in the student
body [was] not probative of employment discrimination .... ." Id Justice White
concurred in the judgment, but concluded that none of the Board's interests, even
in combination, could constitute a compelling state interest. See id. at 295
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, found
it significant that the Teachers' Union had ratified the preferential layoff provision
and that the procedure helped to maintain recent gains in minority hiring made
under a constitutionally valid affirmative action hiring policy. See Wygant, 476 U.S.
at 300, 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 283-84. In Wygant, the 1972 Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the local School Board and Teachers' Union provided that during layoffs,
'teachers with the most seniority in the district [would] be retained, except that at
no time [would] there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than
the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff."
Id. at 270. During later years, the School Board laid off plaintiffs, who were non-
minority teachers with seniority but retained some minority teachers. See id. at 272.
37. See id. at 275-78.
[Vol. 6: p. 347
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First, Justice Powell concluded that societal discrimination
alone was "too amorphous" to support race-based remedial action
as a compelling governmental interest.38 Second, Justice Powell de-
termined that the preferential layoff system failed the narrowly tai-
lored means test.3 9 Although he maintained the view that innocent
individuals can permissibly bear some burden in effecting strategies
to remedy racial discrimination, Justice Powell concluded that
forfeiting existing employment constituted a burden that was im-
permissibly onerous. 40 Forfeiture of employment was simply too
much to ask a single individual to contribute to any remedial
plan.41 Moreover, the School Board could institute a less intrusive
alternative method to remedy past discrimination, such as a prefer-
ential hiring plan.
42
4. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,43 the Court invalidated a
city plan that set aside thirty percent of local construction funding
for awards to minority contractors. 44 For the majority, Justice
38. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. For a definition of "race-based," see T. Alexan-
der Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1063 (1991)
(identifying "race-based" as "decisions and conduct that would have been different
but for the race of those benefited or disadvantaged by them").
39. See id. at 283. Justice Powell proceeded to the second prong of the analysis
because findings that the Jackson School Board had previously discriminated
against hiring minority faculty could prove that a compelling governmental inter-
est existed. See id. at 275-78.
40. See Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 (1986); see also Engi-
neering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1546, 1583
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (noting that exclusion from potential future employment consti-
tuted less onerous burden than loss of current employment). But see Local 28 of
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 488 n.3 (1986) (contend-
ing that courts should distinguish impermissible burdens according to effect from
loss of current or possible employment, rather than according to simplistic distinc-
tions between labels like "hiring goals" and "layoffs"). See generally Steven K.
DiLiberto, Comment, Setting Aside Set Asides: The New Standard for Affirmative Action
Programs in the Construction Industry, 42 ViLL. L. REv. 2039, 2097 (1997) (observing
that construction industry set-asides can fail narrow tailoring prong by either dis-
rupting settled rights and expectations or excluding non-minority contractor who
has expended significant resources to submit bid).
41. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282. Justice Powell distinguished Fullilove on the
grounds that the 10 percent set-aside spread its burden among many cOnt-actors,
only precluding their competition for certain contracts. See id. at 283.
42. See id. at 282-83.
43. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
44. See id. at 469. Under the plan, the city would award the set-aside portion
of contracts to minority business enterprises (MBEs) located anywhere in the
United States, not just to local minority enterprises. See id. Minority enterprises
included those with at least fifty percent ownership by African-American, "Spanish-
speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut citizens." Id.
7
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O'Connor held that the plan violated the individually held rights of
non-minority contractors, which were guaranteed by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Specifically, the
plan excluded non-minorities from competition for certain public
contracts based on racial classification. 46
Interpreting all racial classifications as suspect, Justice
O'Connor stated that only strict scrutiny can distinguish invidious
classifications from classifications that are benign or remedial. 47
Under the first prong of the analysis, the Court concluded that the
city had not proven a compelling interest because it had not
presented specific findings that the city, itself, had discriminated in
the award of past construction contracts. 48
Under the second prong of the analysis, the Court found that
the thirty percent requirement was not narrowly tailored to achieve
any permissible goal.49 Specifically, the Court concluded that the
The plan permitted waiver if a constructor showed that qualified minority
businesses were unavailable to satisfy the quota. See id. at 478-79. However, when
Croson's recruitment efforts failed to secure the requisite minority subcontracts
and the company applied for waiver of the requirement, the city denied its re-
quest. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 481-83.
While calculating its bid, Croson unsuccessfully solicited subcontracting bids
from at least five MBEs. See id. at 482. Just before the general bids were due,
Croson located a willing minority subcontractor. See id. Unfortunately, the sub-
contractor failed to compute its bid in time leaving Croson to submit its MBE-
deficient bid and request a waiver of the quota. See id. The subcontractor subse-
quently bid a price, which exceeded the figure Croson had factored into its bid by
$7,663.16. See id at 483.
The city rejected Croson's waiver request because of the available MBE's bid.
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 483. The city also refused to raise the contract price to
accommodate the extra subcontracting expense or to grant Croson the project
even though it had submitted the only bid. See id. Instead, the city decided to hold
an entirely new bidding competition. See id.
45. See id. at 493. The Clause provides that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. Justice O'Connor reiterated Justice Powell's statement in Bakke that
equal protection cannot operate differently when applied to different races, even
when applied to a member of a historically benefited race. See id. at 494; see also
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).
46. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
47. See id. Justice O'Connor described the two-pronged strict scrutiny stan-
dard as follows:
(1) [T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool; . . . (2) The test also
ensures that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
Id. at 493.
48. See id. at 504.
49. See id. at 507. The only possible goal the Court discerned was "outright
racial balancing." Id. Justice O'Connor noted that even this impermissible goal
[Vol. 6: p. 347
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set-aside plan failed strict scrutiny because the remedial rationales
for the plan, as well as its method of application, were arbitrary. 50
First, the Court found that the city's evidence of past discrimina-
tion, statistical comparisons of public contracts awarded to minority
enterprises with the number of minorities in the city's total popula-
tion, was inapposite and capricious. 51 Second, the Court found that
the thirty percent quota was an inescapably random figure. 52
Third, the haphazard inclusion of certain racial groups granted
remedies to peoples who had never suffered discrimination in Rich-
mond, if they had ever lived in the city at all.
5 3
5. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,54 the Supreme Court upheld
two FCC policies that operated according to racial classifications.55
Under one policy, the FCC Review Board awarded "substantial en-
hancement" to minority-owned broadcasters who competed with
non-minorities for new licenses.56 Under the other policy, a broad-
rested on the unfounded assumption that under completely equitable circum-
stances, minorities would "choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their
representation in the local population." Croson, 488 U.S. at 507; see also Local 28 of
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see Contractors Ass'n of Eastern
Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 602 (3d Cir. 1996) (suggesting that
disparity index, comparing city contracts awarded to minority group against statis-
tical expectation based on group's participation in bidding processes, satisfied
Croson evidentiary standard).
50. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 510.
51. See id. at 501. To comprehend past discrimination when special qualifica-
tions are involved, legislatures should consider the population of available quali-
fied minorities rather than the percentage of minorities in the total population.
See id. at 501-02; see also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
(1977).
52. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. The Court found no permissible rationale for
the arbitrary percentage. See id. It suspected two impermissible goals caused the
city to choose a random quota. See id. at 507-08. First, the city might have wanted
to achieve "outright racial balancing." Id Second, the city may have aimed to ease
its administrative burden by enforcing an arbitrary remedial quota instead of cus-
tomizing remedies on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 508.
53. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506. The Court noted that it
may well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen ....
If a [thirty percent] set aside was 'narrowly tailored' to compensate [Afri-
can-American] contractors for past discriminaton, one may le imately
ask why they are forced to share this 'remedial relief with an Aleut citizen
who moves to Richmond tomorrow?
Id.
54. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
55. See id. at 552.
56. See id. at 556, 558. Although the Review Board apparently gave minority
ownership significant weight, the Board also considered other factors including
local residence and civic participation. See id. at 559. Officially, the Commission
9
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caster whose license was in jeopardy from a revocation or renewal
review could opt to avoid those unpleasant proceedings by as-
signing the license to a minority enterprise in a "distress sale."57
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stressed that Con-
gress had recently prohibited the FCC from spending appropriated
funds to evaluate or alter its minority ownership policies.58 Before
the new legislation, the FCC had suspended the proceedings under-
lying the Metro Broadcasting decision pending a reevaluation of its
minority ownership policies in a separate inquiry.59 The congres-
sional prohibition on spending, however, effectively mandated con-
tinuity of the existing FCC minority ownership policies.60 Deferring
to this congressional mandate, Justice Brennan applied the stan-
dard advocated by Justice Marshall in Fullilove', that is, whether a
benign racial classification serves an important government objec-
tive and relates substantially to achieving that objective. 61
Justice Brennan concluded that promoting future program-
ming diversity, rather than just remedying prior discrimination,
constituted an important governmental goal. 62 Justice Brennan
considered six factors: "diversification of control of mass media communications,
full-time participation in station operation by owners ... , proposed program ser-
vice, past broadcast record, efficient use of the frequency, and the character of the
applicants." Id. at 557; see also Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hear-
ings, I F.C.C.2d 393, 394-99 (1965); Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873
F.2d 347, 350 (1989) (noting that "qualitative enhancements cannot ... overcome
clear quantitative differences").
57. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 557. This constitutes an exception to the
general rule. See id. Usually, FCC regulations prohibit a broadcaster whose license
has been targeted for scrutiny from assigning its license until the FCC has held a
hearing about the license in question. See id.
58. See id. at 563. On December 22, 1987 President Reagan signed the contin-
uing resolution for fiscal year 1988. See Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987).
The resolution prohibited the FCC from using any appropriated funds to alter its
policies promoting ownership of broadcasting licenses by minorities and women.
See id. at 1331. Congress commanded the FCC to restore its policies and to pro-
ceed with cases held in abeyance pending the reexamination process. See id. The
FCC complied by reinstating its earlier decision, upholding the Review Board's
award of the contested license to the minority applicant. See 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 866
(1988).
59. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 558; see also Notice of Inquiry in the
Matter of Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress
Sales and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifica-
tions, 1 F.C.C.R. 1315 (1986).
60. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563.
61. See id. at 564 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473, 519 (1980)).
62. See id. at 566. Justice Brennan reasoned that the finite nature of radio
frequencies required the FCC to ensure that diverse views and materials reached
the public via the limited airwaves. See id. at 566-67; see also Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (stating that "the wildest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public").
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drew a close analogy between diversity in broadcasting and diversity
among a student population, which the Court had previously up-
held as a permissible government objective in Bakke.63 The Court
afforded considerable weight to both expert determinations made
by the FCC and factual findings made by Congress; and thus, con-
cluded that preferential minority ownership policies constituted a
method essential to the promotion of diverse programming.64
Furthermore, Justice Brennan concluded that FCC promotion
of minority ownership of broadcasting licenses, through enhanced
license awards and distress sales, did not shift an onerous burden
onto individual non-minority broadcasters. 65 Justice Brennan
reached this conclusion because the plaintiffs had not forfeited
broadcast licenses that they already possessed.66 Rather, the plain-
tiffs claimed that FCC policies impeded their capacity to secure
licenses at all.6 7 The Court found, however, that the diminished
competitive edge experienced by the plaintiffs constituted a permis-
sible share of the burden in a national process of eradicating
discrimination. 68
Justice O'Connor argued in dissent, however, that remediation of past dis-
crimination constituted the only permissible government objective under the ap-
propriate standard - strict scrutiny. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 612
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Kennedy contended that broadcast-
ing diversity failed to rise to the level of a compelling interest. See id. at 633 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 567-68; see also Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265,
311-13 (1978). Similar to the benefits the entire university community derived
from the academic and social participation of diverse minority students, Justice
Brennan argued that the benefits of diverse radio programming would resonate
throughout the entire listening public. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 568.
64. See id. at 569-79. The Court approved FCC and congressional determina-
tions that minority ownership promotes diversity in broadcasting, rejecting an ar-
gument that impermissible stereotyping undergirded those determinations. See id.
In other words, the determination was not based on a belief that every minority
licensee would produce programming geared toward minority audiences or ex-
press a "discrete minority viewpoint." Id. at 579. Rather, similar to the conclusion
of Justice Powell in Bakke, Congress and the FCC concluded that minority owner-
ship promoted diverse programming when considered in the aggregate. See id.
But see Mishkin, supra note 18, at 883 (arguing that concept of aggregation failed to
satisfy tight means/end fit requirement of strict scrutiny). Also, after reviewing the
FCC's failed past efforts, the Court concluded that race neutral alternatives could
not effectively promote diversity. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 58-89.
65. See id. at 596.
66. See id.; cf. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 (1986)
(holding that forfeiture of current employment imposed impermissible burden on
individual).
67. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 596.
68. See id at 596-97. (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-81; Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 521 (1990)).
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6. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
Five years later, the Court overruled the intermediate scrutiny
standard it had established in Metro Broadcasting.69 In Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena,70 the Court invalidated a federal statute which
required that at least ten percent of funds appropriated by the De-
partment of Transportation be expended with small businesses
owned and controlled by members of groups who had suffered so-
cial and economic disadvantage. 7 1
Pursuant to the statute, the Department of Transportation had
promulgated regulations instructing state governments to presume
that women and members of certain racial groups qualified as dis-
advantaged individuals under the statute.72 In the case that fol-
lowed, Adarand Constructors contended that it lost a subcontract to
a higher-bidding minority business because the government subsidy
provided a financial incentive for the general contractor to hire a
certified disadvantaged subcontractor, which stripped Adarand of
its ability to compete. 73
Writing for the five-to-four majority, Justice O'Connor over-
ruled the intermediate scrutiny standard established in Metro Broad-
casting by holding that "all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be ana-
69. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Under
the intermediate scrutiny standard used in Metro Broadcasting, congressionally man-
dated benign race-conscious policies were permissible if they were substantially re-
lated to achievement of important governmental objectives. See Metro Broadcasting,
497 U.S. at 564-65. During the interim between Metro Broadcasting and Adarand,
the Court's composition changed dramatically. See MARIE T. FINN, THE AMERICAN
BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION 19-22, 52 (8th ed. 1995). Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun and White retired and Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and
Breyer replaced them, respectively. See id. This left onlyJustice Stevens remaining
from the Metro Broadcasting majority. See id. Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
maintained the positions of their predecessors. See id. ButJustice Thomas joined
the four Metro Broadcasting dissenters (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy) to form the five-four Adarand majority. See id.; see
also Mishkin, supra note 18, at 876 (arguing that Supreme Court reversed position
in prior affirmative action cases by applying Croson's strict scrutiny standard to fed-
eral action, abridging judicial deference to Congress).
70. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
71. See Pub. L. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132, 145 § 106(c)(1); Adarand, 515 U.S. at
208.
72. See 49 C.F.R. § 23.62 (1994). Third parties could rebut this presumption
with evidence that a presumptively eligible individual had not suffered actual social
and economic disadvantage. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 208 (referencing 49 C.F.R.
§ 23.62 (1994)).
73. See id. at 208-09. The general contract included a clause stating that if the
contractor awarded a subcontract to a "disadvantaged business enterprise" the gov-
ernment would pay the contractor ten percent of the amount of the subcontract,
not in excess of 1.5 percent of the general contract. See id. at 209.
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lyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. '74 Justice
O'Connor isolated two specific problems with the Metro Broadcasting
decision. 75 First, the Metro Broadcasting majority had "turned its
back" on the concern enunciated by the Croson majority that courts
may be unable to distinguish a truly benign racial classification
from one "motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or
simply racial politics." 7
6
Second, Justice O'Connor reasoned that Metro Broadcasting
contravened the proposition that courts should undertake "congru-
ent" equal protection analyses in the state and federal systems. 77 As
74. Id. at 227.
75. See id. at 224, 226. Justice O'Connor explained the majority's decision to
overrule its Metro Broadcasting precedent, as a return to the Court's (proper) pre-
Metro Broadcasting equal protection jurisprudence. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 233-34.
76. Id. at 226; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989). Justice O'Connor noted that the Metro Broadcasting Court "did not explain
how to tell whether a racial classification should be deemed 'benign,' other than to
express confiden [ce] that an 'examination of the legislative scheme and its history'
will separate benign measures from other types of racial classifications." Adarand,
515 U.S. at 225 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 n.12
(1990)); see also Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the
Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REv. 315 (1998).
Hellman has proposed that the complexity of the Supreme Court's equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, particularly when dealing with moral questions, stems from
conflation of two distinct types of discrimination. See id. at 316. Specifically, the
Court only recognizes "proxy discrimination" which employs one classification to
access a target group, which is characterized by a trait different from the classifica-
tory trait. See id. at 317-18. In contrast, the Court fails to recognize "non-proxy"
discrimination, where the classification, itself, constitutes the goal. See id. at 318.
According to Heller, the Court misapplies a proxy analysis to non-proxy cases
by dealing uniformly with all "classification" issues. See id. at 323-25. The Court's
narrow tailoring concept examines whether a proxy trait (e.g., race) can act as an
effective stand-in for another group (e.g., people who have suffered economic dis-
advantage). See id. at 325. However, since non-proxy cases do not present this
issue (i.e., whether there is a tight fit between proxy trait and target group), the
narrow tailoring concept is inapposite. See id. at 328. Hellman suggests that, in-
stead of worrying about narrow tailoring in non-proxy contexts, the Court should
address moral questions raised by non-proxy discrimination. See id. at 328-29.
Under the similar reasoning of Justice Ginsburg's Adarand dissent, minority
broadcasters are benefited, not because race stands for disadvantage, but because
morally valid reasons (like programming diversity) support such a classification.
See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 273-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But cf Timothy L. Hall,
Educational Diversity: Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 551 (1998) (sug-
gesting that diversity cannot constitute compelling interest because courts use of
race stultifies free intellectual market).
77. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93
(1976)). Commentators have suggested, however, that Justices O'Connor and
Scalia disregarded their positions in Croson when they "inexplicably held in
Adarand that congressional action aimed at remedying effects of past discrimina-
tion in the several states should be analyzed under the same standard as state ac-
tion, using strict scrutiny." Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of
Consistency: Affirmative Action and the Odd Legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 101 DicK. L. REv. 281, 288 (1997).
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a result, Metro Broadcasting also contravened two other propositions
from prior Supreme Court cases - "skepticism" and "consis-
tency."78 According to Justice O'Connor, Metro Broadcasting di-
verged from the prior line of Supreme Court cases by holding that
benign racial classifications warranted less skepticism than other ra-
cial classifications. 79 In addition, the Metro Broadcasting Court vio-
lated the principle of "consistency" by contemplating membership
in an historically advantaged or disadvantaged group as a relevant
factor in its equal protection analysis. 80
It is important to note, however, that the Adarand majority did
not disturb the Metro Broadcasting holding that diversity in broadcast
programming constitutes, at least, an important government
objective. 81
In Croson, where the Court struck down a local ordinance under strict scru-
tiny, both Justices O'Connor and Scalia explicitly stated that Congress gained
power to legislate on case-related issues in its role as enforcer of the Fourteenth
Amendment, while the states' ability to do so became curtailed by enhanced fed-
eral power. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490, 521-22 (O'Connor, J., majority opinion;
Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens observed that these views comported with
the Fullilove plurality and the Metro Broadcasting majority. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at
248-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the same
time it expressly limits the States. This is [based on] consensus.., that
the Federal Government must be the primary defender of racial minori-
ties against the States .... A rule of 'congruence' that ignores a pur-
poseful 'incongruity' so fundamental to our system of government is
unacceptable.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 255 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 226-27. Justice O'Connor conceded that the prior cases addressing
this issue created a constitutional standard for reviewing racial classifications,
which was uncertain "in the details." Id. at 223-24. However, she contended that
those cases taken together had at least established the principles of skepticism,
consistency and congruence. See id. Under "skepticism," all racial classifications
warrant "searching examination." Id. at 223; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986). Under "consistency," each individual receives the
same equal protection of the laws, regardless whether that individual suffered soci-
etal disadvantages or benefited from societal advantages. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at
224 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 494); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289-90 (1978)).
79. See id. at 227. Thus, the majority overcame the problem presented by the
conception of stare decisis it had enunciated in Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 840 (1992) (stating that overruling long-
established precedent may have adverse consequences for "ideal rule of law").
80. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
81. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 566; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 258.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending Adarand did not diminish "[t]he proposition
that fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to justify" a classification
based on race).
[Vol. 6: p. 347
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol6/iss2/5
1999] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN BROADCASTING 361
B. Equal Employment Opportunity Regulations
In the Communications Act of 1934,82 Congress delegated to
the FCC broad authority to promulgate rules regulating the electro-
magnetic spectrum.83 The Telecommunications Act of 199684 reaf-
firmed the 1934 statute, empowering the FCC to "perform any and
all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders...
as may be necessary in the execution of its functions."85 Among its
delegated powers, the FCC has authority to grant and renew
licenses "if public convenience, interest or necessity will be served
thereby .... "86
The 1996 Act added a provision requiring the agency to ascer-
tain certain information before renewing a broadcast license.8 7
First, the FCC must ascertain whether a licensee seeking renewal
has appropriately served the public.88 Second, it must ascertain
whether the licensee seriously or repeatedly violated the 1996 Act
or the FCC's rules and regulations during its previous license
term.89
82. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988). The FCC succeeded the Federal Radio
Commission, established by the Radio Act of 1927, which had not concentrated
authority in a central agency. See SYDNEY W. HEAD & CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING,
BROADCASTING IN AMERICA, 418 (6th ed. 1990).
83. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988). The inherently finite nature of radio
frequencies considered together with a concern to provide a medium for broadly
disparate views and information led Congress to vest the FCC with sweeping regu-
latory authority. See generally FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
377 (1984); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 622 (1994);
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). For a discussion of the
current relevance of non-cable television and radio broadcasting in the age of
cable and satellite television and the internet, see Hearings on S. 707 & S. 1215
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transp., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1989) (testimony of Prof. Dale Kunkel) (sug-
gesting that publicly licensed radio and television broadcasters maintain great pub-
lic influence because many people lack access to alternative sources of information
like cable and satellite television).
84. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1996).
85. Id.
86. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1994) (alteration in original). The FCC exercises sig-
nificant discretion in determining whether granting a license will serve the "public
; t tet ti 1 OA Art loft th. term iindepfnod .QPP .nmnrehen~ive Pnliry Re-
view of Use and Management of the Radio Frequency Spectrum, Notice of Inquiry
and Comments, 54 Fed. Reg. 50, 1694 (1989); see also National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943) (stating that FCC must make case-by-case
determination as to whether grant of license will serve public interest, convenience
or necessity).
87. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k).
88. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (1) (A).
89. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (1) (B).
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To ascertain this information, the FCC considers, among other
factors, whether the licensee has complied with the agency's EEO
regulations.90 Under the relevant regulations, a licensee's past per-
formance must satisfy two closely related requirements.9 1 First, hir-
ing practices must not discriminate against any person on the basis
"of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex." 92 Second, licensed
stations must institute an affirmative EEO program, including a
plan for outreach-style recruitment of minorities and women.93 If
an annual employment report filed by a licensee does not clearly
show that these requirements have been satisfied, the licensee must
file a more detailed account of its recent EEO efforts.9 4
90. See In re Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rules and Policies, Order and No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking, MM Dkt No. 96-16 (1996). Each licensee files a
Broadcast Station Annual Employment Report in May reporting its workforce pro-
file for a selected payroll period, broken down into "full and part-time status, job
category, gender, and race or ethnic origin." Id. 1 8. At the same time, each sta-
tion files a "Broadcast Equal Employment Opportunity Program Report" outlining
general information about the licensee's recruitment and hiring practices during
the last year. See id.
In the case of a licensee employing over ten employees, it will automatically
satisfy EEO requirements if the proportion of minority representation is at least
fifty percent of that of the relevant labor force. See id. 1 10. If not, the FCC issues a
letter of inquiry requesting more detailed documentation of the licensee's recruit-
ment efforts. See id. If the documentation indicates adequate recruitment efforts,
the licensee has not violated FCC regulation regardless of whether those efforts
resulted in employment of minorities. See In re Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rules
and Policies, Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MM Dict No. 96-16, 1 15
(1996).
91. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1997).
92. 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (a) (1997).
93. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (b), (c) (1997). Previous FCC regulations consid-
ered whether the percentage of minority employees correlated to the percentage
of minorities in the relevant working population. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at
347. In 1987, however, the FCC changed the regulations to focus on affirmative
recruitment efforts instead of proportional goals. See id.
94. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (c) (1997). These requirements have developed
since 1968, when a petition from the Board for Homeland Ministries and the Com-
mittee for Racial Justice Now of the United Church of Christ urged the FCC to
deny licenses to broadcasters engaged in discriminatory hiring, creating the impe-
tus for the FCC to first enunciate its anti-discrimination policy. See In re Petition
for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensee to Show Nondiscrimination in
Their Employment Practices, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 1 11 (1968). In its action on the petition,
the FCC found discrimination incompatible with a licensee's duty to serve public
interests and needs under the Communication Act of 1934. See id. 1 9-11. The
next year, the FCC also asserted that its system, which relied solely on complaints,
constituted an inefficient and inadequate method to remedy discrimination for at
least two reasons. See In re Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees
to Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment Practices, Report and Order, 18
F.C.C.2d 240, 1 4 (1969). First, individual complaints consumed unmanageable
agency time. See id. Second, many victims of discrimination did not file com-
plaints for fear that they lacked proof or the possibility to prevail. See id. To over-
come these obstacles, the FCC promulgated rules mandating non-discriminatory
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In the regulations, the FCC outlined procedures designed to
include minorities and women in applicant pools from which they
had often suffered exclusion. Specifically, the regulations required
licensees to design an EEO policy that included an affirmative mi-
nority recruitment plan, to fully inform employees and applicants
about the policy, and to conduct continuing evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of the plan.95 By adopting such procedures, broadcast
licensees automatically satisfied their obligations under the FCC
regulations, even if their efforts did not result in increased employ-
ment of minorities and women.96
III. FACTS
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (the Church) operated two
radio stations under FCC licenses.97 The Church's non-commercial
AM station broadcasted exclusively religious content, while its com-
mercial FM station broadcasted a hybrid format of classical music
and religious programming. 98 A local seminary provided space for
both stations free of rent.99 Under an informal agreement, the
seminary furnished the space for the radio stations in exchange for
efforts by the Church to employ seminarians at its radio stations. 100
Because of the religious mission of the radio stations, the
Church required station employees to know about Lutheran doc-
trine.10 1 Thus, the stations' employment advertisements required
applicants to possess classical music training as well knowledge
hiring procedures for broadcasting licensees and abandoned its former complaint-
based EEO regime. See id. 11 4-5. The FCC first promulgated formal EEO rules in
1970. See In re Petition for Rulemaking to Require Licensees to Show Nondiscrimi-
nation in Their Employment Practices, Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 430 (1970).
95. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (b), (c) (1997). Recommended recruitment tech-
niques include the following: posting the EEO policy at the station; notifying re-
cruitment agencies and local labor unions about the policy; and contacting media
with significant circulation among minorities or women, as well as minority and
women's organizations, for recruiting purposes. See id.
96. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (c).
97. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 347.
100. See id. The Church considered its radio broadcasting to be a part of its
ministry and considered seminarians' participation in that broadcasting to be an
element of their education. See id. at 347. The stations also gave hiring preference
to spouses of seminarians under the thinking that spouses would contribute to
later ministries, and therefore, should participate in aspects of seminary education
like broadcasting. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 347 n.3.
101. See 10 FCC Rcd. 9880, 9886 50 (ALJ 1995); 12 F.C.C.R. 2152, n.2
(1997); Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 346.
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about Lutheranism. 102 In defense of its license renewal application,
the Church contended that widespread minority incompatibility
with these criteria explained apparent deficiencies in the stations'
compliance with the EEO regulations.103 Citing King's Garden, Inc.
v. FCC,104 the Church contended that FCC regulations exempted
religious broadcasters from the general prohibition on preferential
hiring.10 5
The FCC and Administrative Law Judge, however, took a more
limited view of King's Garden.106 They interpreted King's Garden to
exempt religious broadcasters from a general prohibition on pref-
erential hiring only in the hiring of employees whose jobs substan-
tially affect on-air espousal of a religious message. 10 7 Based on this
interpretation, the FCC Review Board concluded that the Church
violated the EEO regulations by discriminating in hiring for the po-
sitions of receptionist, secretary and engineer because such posi-




In deciding Lutheran Church, a panel of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it was required to apply
strict scrutiny under Adarand because the EEO requirements used
racial classifications and effectively pressured FCC licensees to
reach quota-like hiring goals. 109 The panel held that the regula-
tions failed strict scrutiny because they were not narrowly tailored
to fulfill a compelling governmental objective. 110
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
105. See 12 F.C.C.R. 2152 1 9 (1997).
106. See 10 FCC Rcd. 9880, 9907-08 1 213-22 (ALJ 1995); 12 F.C.C.R. 4
(1997).
107. See 12 F.C.C.R. 1 4 (1997).
108. See 12 F.C.C.R. 2152 1 5 (1997). The FCC Review Board found it signifi-
cant that station management did not try to change employment processes to com-
ply with the regulations despite notice from counsel and warnings from a
concerned inferior employee that the Church's employment plan was deficient
under the FCC regulations. See id. Deficiencies included the following: employ-
ment applications lacked notice of the EEO policy but stated a preference for
Lutherans; only cursory and irregular minority recruitment efforts; failure to evalu-
ate success of EEO plan and review it accordingly. See id.
109. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 350-55 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
110. See id. at 356.
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1. Proper Standard of Review: Strict Scrutiny
After determining that the Church had standing to raise an
equal protection challenge, the court considered whether the EEO
regulations warranted strict scrutiny or a more relaxed standard of
review."' Accepting the Church's position that Adarand should
control, the court concluded that it was bound to apply strict
scrutiny.
12
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the FCC's argu-
ment that Adarand only mandates strict scrutiny for practices that
elicit direct race-conscious effects on hiring decisions.1i3 Distin-
guishing Title VII cases in which courts have differentiated between
"preliminary" and "ultimate" employment decisions, the court con-
cluded that no textual basis exists for such a distinction in the
Equal Protection Clause." 4 Because it found no reason to apply
different standards even if such a distinction could be made, the
court determined that it did not need to determine whether the
EEO regulations affected hiring decisions directly or indirectly." 5
111. See id. at 350. In determining that the Church had standing to raise an
equal protection challenge to the regulations, the court stated that the FCC find-
ing that the Church had violated the EEO regulations had harmed the Church.
See id. at 349. Likely harms included: (1) tainting stations' licensing record for
future scrutiny; (2) imposing unreasonable regulatory burden by requiring reme-
dial record-keeping; and (3) economic hardship flowing from development and
administration of involved EEO scheme as well as possible liability in a "reverse-
discrimination" suit. See id. at 349-50. The court suggested, moreover, that "forced
discrimination may itself be an injury." Id.; see also Monterey Mechanical Co. v.
Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "person suffers injury in fact
if the government requires or encourages as a condition of granting him a benefit
that he discriminate against others based on their race or sex").
Alternatively, the court indicated that the Church had standing regardless of
whether it had actually suffered injury. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 350.
Under this theory, the Church could establish standing on behalf of non-minori-
ties who could have suffered subsequent discrimination if the Church had imple-
mented a hiring plan, which satisfied the EEO regulations. See id. at 349.
Specifically, the court held that a plaintiff who is forced to participate in a discrimi-
natory scheme, may bring suit (despite the fact that the scheme will actually injure
others) by raising a third party's constitutional rights when plaintiff is the "only
effective adversary" of the challenged regulation or law. See id.; see also Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953) (permitting white homeowner to challenge re-
strictive covenant imposing racial constraint on conveyance of her property).
112. S-- L."- = C- .... . 141 F3d at 350-51
113. See id. at 351. More specifically, the FCC and DOJ both contended that
"rational basis" constituted the proper standard because the EEO regulations
"stop[ped] short of establishing preferences, quotas, or set-asides." Id.
114. See id.; see also Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding
that section 717 of Title VII, which forbids government from discriminating in
"personnel actions," does not apply to decisions with no immediate effect on
employment).
115. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 331.
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The court found, however, that even if it were required to ap-
ply a less exacting standard to practices that affect employment de-
cisions indirectly, strict scrutiny would still be the appropriate
standard in this case because the FCC regulations at issue effectively
mandated stations to discriminate in hiring.116 Specifically, the
court found that the regulations obliged stations to prefer hiring
minorities to approximate a goal of proportional population repre-
sentation, rather than to merely encourage outreach in recruiting
methods. 117 The court was especially disturbed by the FCC's rec-
ommendation that stations that find statistical "under-representa-
tion" should examine their employment policies, because the court
interpreted the term "under-representation" to indicate the exist-
ence of a quantifiable minority employment requirement for FCC
licensing. 18
Next, the panel rejected the agency's contention that its EEO
program merely sought equitable treatment for minorities."l 9 The
contention failed because, according to the panel, it depended on a
faulty presumption that egalitarian employment practices would
produce statistically proportional minority employment in
broadcasting.' 20
2. Regulations Fail Strict Scrutiny
After holding that strict scrutiny applied, the court next ap-
plied that standard. The court considered, first, whether a permis-
116. See id.
117. See id. at 351-52. In other words, the regulations effectively exerted pres-
sure on broadcasting licensees to satisfy a statistical goal by recommending that
each station evaluate its past and present employment profile by comparison with
the number of employable minorities and women in the area. See id. By reaching
this conclusion, the court rejected its own earlier statement. See id. at 352 n.10. In
dicta to an opinion four years earlier, the court had accepted the FCC's (now
"over-simplified") argument that its EEO regulations do not "'require a licensee to
achieve numerical goals of minority employment as do certain [other] govern-
ment 'affirmative action plans.'" Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 352 n.10 (citing
Florida State Conference of Branches of the NAACP v. FCC, 24 F.3d 271, 272 (D.C.
Cir. 1994)).
118. See id. at 352. Focus on "'under-representation' necessarily implies that
if such a situation exists, the station is behaving in a manner that falls short of the
desired outcome." Id. For the complete text of relevant EEO regulations, see 47
C.F.R. § 73.2080 (a)-(c).
119. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 352.
120. See id. The court stated two reasons for rejecting this presumption: first,
the FCC did not present evidence in its support; second, the FCC had previously
disavowed the proposition when it stated that it did not believe "fair employment
practices will necessarily result in the employment of any minority group in direct
proportion to its numbers in the community." Id. (citing EEO Guidelines for
Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 79 F.C.C.2d 922, 1 19 (1980)).
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sible and compelling governmental objective supported the EEO
regulations, and second, whether the regulations constituted appro-
priately narrow means of achieving that objective.12' The court
concluded that the regulations failed both requirements. 122
Under the first prong of the analysis, the court held that no
compelling governmental interest existed that could validate the
regulations. 123 The court rejected the FCC's suggestion that pro-
motion of diverse programming content constituted a compelling
interest for two reasons. 124 First, the FCC's failure to precisely de-
fine "diverse programming" evoked the criticism that any definition
that would not offend the First Amendment was indefensibly ab-
stract.125 Second, the court concluded that the Metro Broadcasting
Court's characterization of programming diversity as an "impor-
tant" governmental interest could not rise to the level of a compel-
ling governmental interest.' 26
Under the second prong of the analysis, the court rejected the
FCC argument that hiring minority clerical employees constituted a
narrowly tailored method to enhance programming diversity. 127
The court pointed to a logical inconsistency in the FCC's case: since
the FCC had contended that there was no significant connection
between clerical and administrative employees and on-air espousal
of a religious message, it was inconsistent for the FCC to also argue
that minority perspectives would be voiced on the air if radio sta-
121. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 354.
122. See id. at 355-56.
123. See id. at 354.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 354. The court noted that any definition of "diverse program-
ming" based on content would likely present acute First Amendment problems.
See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 354. The court suggested a precise definition: "the
fostering of programming that reflects minority viewpoints or appeals to minority
tastes." Id.
126. See id. As a necessary preliminary to this conclusion, the court referred
to and dismissed two problems presented by Metro Broadcasting first, the Metro
Broadcasting Court was not bothered by the abstract definition of "diverse program-
ming;" second, despite the fact that Adarand overruled intermediate scrutiny, the
Metro Broadcasting Court's characterization of "diverse programming" as a "compel-
ling" interest endured. See id. (refciiinig to Supremc Court's ruling in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 547 (1990)). The court stated, however,
that in light of indications that the Supreme Court has since tried to curtail the
Metro Broadcasting holding, it is unlikely that the diversity interest should now be
considered compelling. See id. Also, the court referred to Justice O'Connor's
Metro Broadcasting dissent, to argue that an interest as "amorphous" as diversity was
not well suited to an analysis of minority perspectives. See id. at 355 (citing Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 614 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
127. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 356.
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tions hired minorities for those same clerical and administrative
positions. 128
B. Dissent of Chief Judge Edwards
In dissent to the court's denial of a petition for rehearing en
banc, ChiefJudge Edwards contended that Adarand did not control
Lutheran Church because obligatory set-asides of public funds are
distinguishable from the FCC requirement that licensees take af-
firmative steps to ensure equal employment opportunities for wo-
men and minorities.129 Under this characterization, the EEO
measures merely required broadcasting licensees to avoid status
quo exclusionary hiring policies, and they did not constitute racial
classifications.13 0
ChiefJudge Edwards, thus, concluded that the majority should
not have applied the strict scrutiny standard.'31 According to Chief
Judge Edwards, the majority reached a different conclusion because
it mischaracterized the regulations as drawing racial classifications,
and therefore, incorrectly subjected them to the Adarand hold-
ing.13 2 Contrary to this mischaracterization, the regulations merely
provided guidelines to aid stations in constructing lawful, non-dis-
criminatory hiring programs. 133
Distinguishing the obligatory set-asides at issue in Adarand,
Chief Judge Edwards observed that the FCC regulations merely sug-
gested strategies that broadcasters could employ to heighten aware-
ness of latent discrimination in hiring practices. 34 Neither the
requirement that stations evaluate employment profiles nor the
processing guidelines for FCC review obliged licensees to prefer wo-
men and minorities when hiring.'35
ChiefJudge Edwards suggested, moreover, that "no suspect 'ra-
cial classification' need arise simply because the law dictates that an
128. See id. The court believed that the term "diversity" was forced to repre-
sent several concepts, which were actually distinct. See id. Specifically, the court
suggested that twentieth-century Americans have overburdened the term "diver-
sity" by using it to both justify affirmative racial policies and as a "synonym for
proportional representation itself." Id.
129. See id. at 497 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
130. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 497 (Edwards, CJ., dissenting).
131. See id.
132. See id. at 498-99.
133. See id at 497 (1998) (Edwards, CJ., dissenting). The EEO regulations
only influence hiring decisions "in the sense that anti-discrimination law generally
seeks to influence employers to avoid bias." Id. at 496-97.
134. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 498-99.
135. See id.
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employer might have to explain, on pain of sanction, why its hiring
decisions were nondiscriminatory." 136 Although race may play a
role in the FCC's decision to review a station's hiring procedures,
the Chief Judge continued, this does not compel a broadcaster to
institute preferences to avoid investigation.1 3 7
Finally, Chief Judge Edwards criticized the majority for unreal-
istically advocating "color-blindness" when "'race' exists as a social
fact."' 3 8 The ChiefJudge believed that the majority erred by requir-
ing strict scrutiny analysis whenever a policy makes an employer
conscious of race. i3 9 Rather, Chief Judge Edwards stated that "a
person who is being scrupulously and self-consciously careful not to
be a racist in a hiring decision is certainly 'conscious of' race - but
in a positive way."' 40
C. Dissent of Judge Tatel
Like Chief Judge Edwards, Judge Tatel thought that Adarand
did not require strict scrutiny analysis in the Lutheran Church situa-
tion.14 ' Judge Tatel distinguished Adarand from Lutheran Church on
the basis that set-aside funds effectively excluded Adarand Construc-
tors from business competition, whereas the FCC's employment
136. Id at 497-98 (referring to disparate impact test enunciated in Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982)).
137. See id. at 497-98. The Justice Department had a similar view. After the
Supreme Court decided Adarand, the DOJ issued a detailed memorandum consid-
ering which types of affirmative action programs would be subject to future strict
scrutiny. See Ann Devroy & Kevin Merida, Justice Department Outlines Standards for
Affimative Action, WASH. POST, June 29, 1995, at A10. The Justice Department
memorandum stated the following:
Mere outreach and recruitment efforts ... typically should not be subject
to the Adarand standards. Indeed, post Croson cases indicate that such
efforts are considered race-neutral means of increasing minority opportu-
nity. In some sense, of course, the targeting of minorities through out-
reach and recruitment campaigns involves race-conscious action. But the
objective there is to expand the pool of applicants or bidders to include
minorities, not to use race or ethnicity in the actual decision. If the gov-
ernment does not use racial or ethnic classifications in selecting persons
from the expanded pool, Adarand ordinarily would be inapplicable.
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of
i-.cgal Co.unlC, UnAitedI Stats Dtp~L. ofJ'asucc, toS a" Ik1t.genci GeerlC .
28, 1995) (footnotes omitted), at 7 [hereinafter Dellinger].
138. Lutheran Church I, 154 F.3d at 498. Some commentators have agreed.
See, e.& Peter D. Sahlins, Assimilation, American Style, 66 GEO. WASH. L. Rlv. 698, 727
(1998) (book review) (characterizing Justice O'Connor's concept of consistency
.as a matter of formal logic, not messy factual analysis").
139. See Lutheran Church I, 154 F.3d at 498.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 501 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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regulations effectively included an expanded range of applicants in
competition for jobs.142 Although the regulations increased com-
petition for employment from the view of those benefited by exclu-
sionary status quo hiring procedures, the regulations did not
exclude anyone from that competition. 143
Judge Tatel concluded that the majority's decision to apply
strict scrutiny extended Adarand beyond the prior interpretation of
the Supreme Court or any other circuit court.'4 Judge Tatel con-
tended that Adarand extended strict scrutiny only to governmental
classifications that effectively treat individuals differently according
to race. 145 In other words, instead of mere race consciousness, only
unequal treatment based on race triggers strict scrutiny. 146
First, Judge Tatel distinguished the facts of Adarand from those
in Lutheran Church.147 Specifically, government bonuses paid to
contractors employing minority subcontractors are vastly different
from the FCC's employment regulations. 148 Judge Tatel based this
observation on the fact that Adarand-type bonuses gave minority
contractors a manifest competitive advantage, while the EEO regu-
lations did not give minority job applicants a comparable advantage
in the broadcasting industry.149 Thus, Judge Tatel determined that
differential treatment had not followed from racial classification in
Lutheran Church.150
Second, Judge Tatel construed the major cases bolstering the
Adarand decision differently from the majority.151 He viewed the
Croson, Wygant and Bakke decisions as requiring actual unequal
142. See id. at 502.
143. See id. at 502-03.
144. See Lutheran Church I, 154 F.3d at 500. Judge Tatel found that the major-
ity should have granted the FCC's motion to remand for reconsideration of the
Church's Lutheran hiring preference according to new FCC regulations and un-
conditional FCC renewal of the Church's broadcasting licenses. See id. Had the
court remanded, it would have adhered to the canon of construction that courts
should avoid adjudicating constitutional questions when possible. See id. (citing
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)). If the FCC
later found that the Church's outreach program violated the new regulations dur-
ing a future review, the Church could have then raised the constitutional chal-
lenge. See id
145. See id. at 501.
146. See Lutheran Church I, 154 F.3d at 502.
147. See id
148. See id.
149. See id Rather, STURAA guaranteed the general contractor would re-
ceive extra governmental remuneration for hiring a minority- controlled subcon-
tractor. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 206 (1995).
150. See Lutheran Church 1, 154 F.3d at 502.
151. See id. at 503.
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treatment for racial classifications to trigger strict scrutiny.152 In ac-
cord with the conclusion of Chief Judge Edwards, Judge Tatel con-
cluded that the EEO regulations did not produce unequal
treatment.153 Rather, the regulations promoted equal treatment.154
Judge Tatel had to deal with the majority's conclusion that the
regulations in both Adarand and Lutheran Church provided "finan-
cial incentives" to hire preferentially, rather than requiring such
preferences outright.1 55 Judge Tatel distinguished Adarand on the
basis that the non-minority subcontractor had challenged the regu-
lation because it effectively incapacitated him in his ability to bid
competitively against minority subcontractors. 156  In Lutheran
Church, the EEO regulations did not create a comparable effect be-
cause they did not make minority candidates more employable than
non-minority candidates.1 57
Judge Tatel reasoned that the EEO regulations offered no real
incentive for stations to give preference to minorities in hiring.' 58
He provided two illustrations. 159 First, stations with inadequate out-
reach programs could not protect themselves from enforcement ac-
tions by preferentially hiring minority employees to meet a
152. See id.; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 469
(1989) (striking city requirement that thirty percent of subcontracting for public
construction contracts go to minority businesses); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (concluding school board used racial preferences to de-
termine which teachers to lay off); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
274 (1978) (stating that public medical school reserved class slots for minority stu-
dents and evaluated minority applicants under less demanding admissions
criteria).
153. See Lutheran Church 1, 154 F.3d at 502-03. Judge Tatel found that the
challenged regulations did not direct stations to hire any individual on the basis of
race, require stations to maintain a specified racial balance in employment, or con-
fer or withhold benefits on the basis of race. See id& "Indeed, nothing in the regu-
lations prevents stations from evaluating job applicants solely on the basis of
individual merit." Id. at 502. Judge Tatel noted that the Eleventh Circuit reached
a similar conclusion in Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1557-
58 (11th Cir. 1994), where the court described "school recruitment programs
targeted at minorities and outreach programs led by minorities as race-neutral."
Lutheran Church , 154 F.3d at 502.
154. See id. at 501-02. The regulations "merely require broadcasters to elimi-
nate discriminatory practices, to expand the pool from which they hire, and keep
adequate records." Id. at 502.
155. See id.
156. See id. In other words, "the core of the equal protection challenge was
not that the system of bonuses provided an incentive for prime contractors to
grant a racial preference, but that the bonuses directly put minority-owned subcon-
tractors in a more competitive bidding position than non-minority owned subcon-
tractors." Lutheran Church 1, 154 F.3d at 502.
157. See itt at 502.
158. See id. at 502.
159. See id.
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statistical goal. 160 Second, stations with adequate outreach pro-
grams would never face sanctions, such as non-renewal of broadcast
licenses, for failing to reach specific numerical levels of minority
hiring.161
V. CRITICAL ANALYsIs
In Lutheran Church, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals incorrectly concluded that the FCC's equal employment
opportunity regulations warranted strict scrutiny. 162 On a formal
level, the regulations did not create quota-like requirements based
on race. 163 On a practical level, the regulations did not prevent
individuals from competing for jobs in broadcasting. Rather, the
regulations enhanced competition for jobs by expanding the scope
of applicants with access to employment opportunities in broadcast-
ing.164 Thus, the heightened strict scrutiny standard was inappro-
priate in this case.
Under strict scrutiny, however, the EEO regulations fail both
prongs of the analysis. First, the current Supreme Court would not
find that prospective broadcasting diversity constitutes a compelling
governmental interest. 165 Second, the regulations cannot offer a
narrowly tailored solution to employment inequities in the broad-
casting industry. 166
A. Should Strict Scrutiny Apply?
In Lutheran Church, the majority's determination that the EEO
regulations warranted strict scrutiny was based on a mischaracter-
ization of those regulations. 167 Instead of requiring broadcasting
160. See id; see also In re Kelly Communications, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R 17 868 it 11-
13 (1997).
161. See Lutheran Church I, 154 F.3d at 502; see also In re Louisiana Broadcast
Stations, 7 F.C.C.R. 17, 868 11 16-19 (1992) (holding station complied with EEO
rule based on its minority recruitment efforts despite failure to hire any minori-
ties); In re Applications of Certain Broadcast Stations Serving Communities in the
Miami, Florida Area, 5 F.C.C.R. 4893 1 13-17 (1990) (stating that FCC considers
"overall efforts to recruit, hire and promote minorities").
162. See Lutheran Church 1, 154 F.3d at 497 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting), 502-03
(Tatel, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 497 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 502-03 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
165. See RobertJ. Donahue, Racial Diversity as a Compelling Governmental Inter-
est, 30 IND. L. REv. 523, 549 (1997).
166. See Policy Statement and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Matter
of Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849 1 2 (1982).
167. See Lutheran Church 1, 154 F.3d at 496-97 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 6: p. 347
26
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol6/iss2/5
1999] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN BROADCASTING 373
licensees to hire along racial lines or to fulfill racial quotas, the reg-
ulations merely required licensees to implement recruitment poli-
cies designed to encompass qualified local minorities in applicant
pools from which they have been historically excluded.' 68 In other
words, the Church did not violate the regulations by hiring white
Lutherans instead of hiring a given number or percentage of mi-
norities-because such a requirement did not exist in the regula-
tions. 169 Rather, the Church violated the regulations by neglecting
to design and implement an affirmative minority recruitment plan
that complied with FCC specifications. 170
The majority of the court glossed over the difference between
set-aside public funds for minority subcontractors and the FCC re-
quirement that its licensees make affirmative efforts to include eligi-
ble minority candidates in applicant pools. 17' The essential differ-
ence is the following: the FCC would not award license renewal to a
broadcaster who had failed to institute a valid recruitment plan
even if that broadcaster hired minorities, whereas in Adarand, the
168. See id. The majority asserted that the regulations injured the Church by
tarnishing its spotless licensing record and increasing its regulatory burden by re-
quiring detailed employment records. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v.
FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The injury that Adarand Constructors
suffered, however, was exclusion from competition for a construction contract. See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1995).
169. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(a) (1997). A rejected minority applicant could,
of course, show that the broadcaster had discriminated on the basis of race when it
hired a white applicant. See id.
170. See In re Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rules and Policies, Order and No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking, MM Dkt No. 96-16 15 (1996) (characterizing EEO
regulations as race-neutral).
171. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 208; see also Dellinger, supra note 137. Similarly,
Chief Judge Edwards concluded in his dissent that Adarand does not control this
case because the regulations merely ask broadcasters to factor the reality of racial
discrimination into their hiring procedures and not to participate in perpetuation
of status quo discrimination. See Lutheran Church I, 154 F.3d at 498-99.
Regardless of their constitutionality after Adarand, the FCC's employment reg-
ulations have not had a significant diversifying impact on broadcasting license
ownership. See Daniel D. Barnes, Market Reforms in Telecommunications Licensing, 48
ADMIN. L. REv. 439 n.47 (1996). "Minorities and women have a very small role in
the communications industry. The FCC estimates that women or minorities own
only one or two percent of all communications companies. Of 10,000 commercial
broadcast radio and television stations, only 300 are minority controlled." Wells,
supra note 1, at Cl.
At least one commentator, however, has criticized the Adarand majority's con-
clusion on the grounds that the ten percent set-aside was based on demonstrated
social and economic disadvantage, rather than a presumption that disadvantage
coincided with racial minority. See Steven H. Hobbs, Personal Reflections on Adarand
Construction Co. v. Pena, 2 RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L. DIG. 18, 19 (1996). Under
this reasoning, Adarand Constructors could have competed for the set-aside con-
tract if it had shown past disadvantage, despite its status as a white-owned business.
See id.
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Department of Transportation only awarded extra compensation to
a general contractor who subcontracted ten percent of its work to
minority contractors, regardless of how it recruited its
employees. 172
"Benign" classifications and policies are, moreover, fundamen-
tally different from measures like the EEO regulations that reject
theories advocating pure "color-blindness" and affirmatively recog-
nize pervasive racial discrimination as a social fact.173 If the regula-
tions were race-neutral rather than benign racial classifications,
then Justice O'Connor's concern that courts cannot distinguish be-
nign racial classifications from those that are invidious would not
be relevant. 174
The Justice Department reached this conclusion when it ana-
lyzed Adarand to understand implications that the decision had for
government affirmative action programs. The Justice Department
predicted that, even after Adarand, the courts would approve out-
reach policies that were intended to increase minority opportuni-
ties, because such efforts were race-neutral.1 75 Under this inter-
172. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 208; 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (a). With this distinc-
tion in mind, the ALJ did not consider the hiring of a Hispanic woman by the
station as a strong plus in the Church's favor. See In re Applications of Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod, 10 FCC Rcd. 9880, 9912 (1995). The District of Columbia
Circuit majority, however, asserted that the ALJ "discounted her hire... [because]
he thought that the station was insufficiently race-conscious when it hired her."
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 352.
The majority concluded that the EEO regulations effectively made broadcast-
ers decide to hire minorities at the expense of qualified non-minorities. See id. at
351. Again, this conflates two distinct moments of decision-making. See Lutheran
Church I, 154 F.3d at 498-99 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). The regulations affect the
broadcaster's (preliminary) decision to actively endeavor to include minorities in it
its applicant pool, whereas STURAA affected the general contractor's (subse-
quent) decision about which among the available applicant pool to hire. See id.
The right to compete for a contract is also distinguishable from the right to
possess a broadcasting license, which is subject to limitations. See Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (stating that licensee "has no constitu-
tional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio
frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens"). The FCC has long recognized
that broadcasters stand in a fiduciary relationship to the public, requiring them to
offer programming that reflects the local community because of the inherently
limited nature of radio frequencies. See id.
173. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE LJ. 758, 847 (1990) (ob-
serving that racial differences comprise important "precondition to meaningful
negotiation of the terms of our social spaces").
174. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229.
175. See Dellinger, supra note 137, at 7. In Adarand, Justice O'Connor advo-
cated a "color-blind" approach to racial issues that echoed Justice Powell's state-
ment that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another
color." Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978); see also PaulJ. Mishkin,
Foreword: The Making of a Turning Point - Metro and Adarand, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 875
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pretation, Adarand would not control the EEO regulations at issue
in Lutheran Church.176
B. Programming Diversity Fails Compelling Interest Test 177
If strict scrutiny applies, prospective broadcasting diversity
probably cannot rise to the level of a compelling governmental in-
terest in light of Adarand.178 Although diversity has a long history
of Supreme Court recognition as a governmental interest which
could sustain otherwise suspect government programs under equal
protection analyses, Adarand has effectively eviscerated this prece-
dent.179 In an influential recent case, Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth
Circuit retreated from reference to diversity as an interest that
could potentially validate a suspect classification. 80 Rather, the
n.4 (1996) (suggesting that, since Brown v. Board of Educ., "fundamental constitu-
tional concept presupposed an individualist society in which government ... was
'color-blind'" and contending that Justice Powell agreed in Bakke). But see Neal
Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme
Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 673, 674 (1996) (lament-
ing that,"[1]ike a phoenix rising from the ashes, calls for a 'color-blind society' are
again sweeping the nation"). See generally ANDREW KuLL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTI-
TUTION (1992) (examining evolution of American color-blind jurisprudence).
176. See Dellinger, supra note 137, at 7. See also S. Jenell Trigg, The Federal
Communication Commission's Equal Employment Opportunity Program and the Effect of
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 4 COMM. L. CoN. 237, 246 (1996).
177. The regulations would probably also fail the narrow tailoring prong of
strict scrutiny because, as the FCC has admitted, EEO programs combined with
compulsory collaboration with minority leaders to ascertain community needs
during the 1960s and 1970s were unable to rectify the dearth of minority
viewpoints in broadcasting. See Policy Statement and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in the Matter of Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of
Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849 1 2 (1982).
178. See Donahue, supra note 165, at 549 (predicting Supreme Court will find
racial diversity does not constitute compelling government interest because: (1)
Adarand and Hopwood compromised precedent provided by Bakke and Metro Broad-
casting, (2) remediation of past discrimination has displaced diversity as compel-
ling interest in affirmative action cases; and (3) five Justice Supreme Court
majority is currently hostile to diversity interest). But see Goodwin Liu, Affirmative
Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 381, 413 (1998) (contending that remedial and diversity
rationales derive from same moral "aspiration to eradicate... entrenched system
of racial caste" such that conceptual separation rings artificial).
179. See Donahue. subra note 165, at 549. For a discussion of the history of
diversity as a governmental goal, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (holding that student
diversity constituted permissible state goal) (Powell,J.); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding programming diversity constituted important
permissible governmental objective). But see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 257. In his
Adarand dissent, Justice Stevens argued that Metro Broadcasting enunciated the
Court's view that prospective programming diversity constituted a governmental
interest, which could sustain racial classifications. See id. at 257-58.
180. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 932 (5th Cir. 1995). But see WILLIAM
G. BOWEN AND DEREK BoK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER, Princeton Univ. Press (1998)
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Fifth Circuit held that remedial interests are, exclusively, able to con-
stitute a compelling government interest. 8 1
VI. IMPACT
The Lutheran Church holding extended and galvanized the
power of Adarand to invalidate affirmative action programs. 18 2
Although the Supreme Court has not yet identified a workable dis-
tinction between benign and invidious classifications, it has also
never held that race-neutral outreach programs that promote di-
verse applicant pools cannot be distinguished from those that
award preferences on the basis of racial classifications. 18 3 In Lu-
theran Church, the District of Columbia Circuit majority conflated
these concepts. The court, moreover, subjected the outreach pro-
grams to strict scrutiny without carefully analyzing the degree of
pressure to hire minorities and women, if any, that broadcasting
licensees experienced as a result of the EEO regulations. 184
Commentators have voiced concerns about judicial rulings,
such as Lutheran Church, which extend Adarand.'8 5 Such decisions
could make Congress feel more comfortable about invalidating out-
reach-based affirmative action programs through new legislation.'8 6
Even without specific legislation, however, the Lutheran Church deci-
sion will inhibit the FCC from fostering participation by minorities
and women in publicly licensed television and radio broadcasting,
(providing comprehensive study and analysis of societal benefits from race-con-
scious admissions policies in higher education).
181. See id. But seeWittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (unani-
mous opinion) (Posner, C.J.) (rejecting Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Hopwood and
holding that "penological necessity" of maintaining African-American guard staff
in correctional boot camp populated by mainly African-American inmates consti-
tuted compelling state interest).
182. For a discussion of the Adarand holding and the Supreme Court's rea-
soning, see supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text; see also Steven H. Hobbs,
Personal Reflections on Adarand Construction Co. v. Pena, 2 RACE & ETHNIC ANCES-
TRY L. DIG. 18, 20 (1996) (contending that Adarand majority foreclosed "creative
possibilities [to correct] noxious legacy of discrimination").
183. See supra notes 17-96 and accompanying text. In other words, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit's holding conceals the distinction between governmental
actions that prevent non-minorities from competing for work and governmental
actions that compel employers to merely permit minorities to compete for work.
See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 154 F.3d 487, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(Edwards, C.J., dissenting), 502-03 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
184. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
185. See R. Michael Senkowski & Clifford M. Sloan, The Telecommunications
Two-Step: One Step Forward and One Step Back in the Wake of Adarand, 39 How. L.J.
505, 529 (1996).
186. See id.
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187. See id. In November 1998, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rule
Making (NPRM) requesting comments on its EEO rules in light of Lutheran
Church. See In re Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Rules and Policies, MM Docket No. 98-204, 13 FCC Rcd. 23,004
(1998). The FCC stated that, although Lutheran Church did not control EEO regu-
lations for cable, it intended to modify similar cable regulations concerning re-
cruitment of minorities and women, self-assessment of EEO policies and required
employment record-keeping. See id. In December 1998, however, the FCC issued
another NPRM requesting comments on proposals to retain efforts-based EEO pol-
icies but to remove from the regulations all language referring to statistical repre-
sentation of minorities and women. See Revision of Broadcast and Cable EEO
Rules and Policies, 63 Fed. Reg. 66104 (1998).
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